Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps by Nabe, Jonathan & Fowler, David
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Conference Papers and Presentations Morris Library
6-2011
Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next
Steps
Jonathan Nabe
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, jnabe@lib.siu.edu
David Fowler
University of Oregon
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/morris_confs
Presented at the NASIG 26th Annual Conference, June 3, 2011, St. Louis, MO.
This is a preprint of an article submitted for consideration in the Serials Librarian, available online at:
www.tandfonline.com. The postprint is available at
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/morris_articles/55.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Morris Library at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Conference Papers and
Presentations by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nabe, Jonathan and Fowler, David, "Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps" (2011). Conference Papers and Presentations.
Paper 14.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/morris_confs/14
Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps 
Presented at the North American Serials Interest Group, 26th Annual Conference, June 3, 2011 
By Jonathan Nabe and David C. Fowler 
Introduction 
 
The intent of this session, Leaving the Big Deal: Consequences and Next Steps, was to provide 
some level of comfort to those who are contemplating leaving big deals.  The experience of Southern 
Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC) and the University of Oregon (UO) should help provide that comfort.   
The consequences of leaving these deals have been less than what might be expected.  Given 
this, the question arises, why don’t more institutions make similar decisions?  Why are big deals so 
persistent?  The reluctance to take the big step may be tied to two chief concerns: 
Perceived value, mostly measured in terms of download numbers, and fear of the reaction from 
the University community.  Both of these concerns are shown to be overstated by the experience of these 
two institutions. 
 
The Southern Illinois University - Carbondale Experience 
Background 
 
SIUC is classified as a Carnegie high research university, and is part of the Southern Illinois 
University system, which includes a Medical School, a Law School, and a sister campus, SIU 
Edwardsville.  SIUC offers 32 doctoral and professional programs and 75 Master’s programs.  Total 
student enrollment for SIUC is just over 20,000.  Morris Library is an ARL library, holds 2.8 million 
volumes, and has a collection budget of $5.3 million. 
 
Morris Library and the Big Deals 
 
SIUC’s Morris Library has a great deal of experience with ending Big Deals, as we have left three 
big deals in the last three years.  These were agreements with Springer and Wiley, via the Greater 
Western Library Alliance (GWLA), and Elsevier, which involved Southern Illinois University Edwardsville 
(SIUE). 
The impacts of leaving are real in a number of areas, some obvious and predictable, some more 
subtle or unexpected.  Five specific areas of impact were examined and form the basis of this 
presentation: lost access to titles; changes in interlibrary loan requests; reaction from the University 
community; impact on the collection budget; and impact on the library collection itself. 
 
Measuring Impact: Lost Access 
 
The loss in overall number of titles is significant.  Specifically, access was lost access to 1,100 
titles from Springer, 597 titles from Wiley, and 242 titles from Elsevier.  In assessing the impact of these 
losses, download statistics from the year prior to departure from the respective deals were collected and 
analyzed.  For the Springer titles, there were 10,000 downloads from the 1,100 lost titles.  For Wiley, 
there were 11,254 downloads for the 597 lost titles.  For Elsevier, there were 19,452 downloads from the 
242 lost titles.  In total, there were 40,000 total downloads from non-subscribed titles in the year prior to 
departure from these three publishers. 
These numbers are significant, and it can be deceptively disheartening to lose this access.  
However, these numbers do not provide an accurate or complete assessment of the impact to the 
University community.  More detailed examination of these numbers provides a clearer indication of the 
value of the non-subscribed titles contained within each of the Big Deals. 
For the Springer titles, eighty-two percent of the non-subscribed titles received one or fewer 
download per month.  Further, thirty-five percent of these titles had no downloads in the year examined.  
For Wiley, these numbers were sixty-two percent and ten percent, respectively.  For Elsevier, twenty-eight 
percent of the titles had one or fewer downloads in the year prior to departure from the Big Deal, and two 
titles received no downloads.  This clearly shows that many of the non-subscribed titles were superfluous 
to the needs of the University community. 
 Measuring Impact: Interlibrary Loan  
 
Other metrics help to provide a fuller picture of the impact.  One way to measure the true impact 
is by the number of interlibrary loans (ILLs) filled for titles that were previously part of the Big Deals, the 
non-subscribed titles.  Interlibrary loans require staff time and can carry copyright fees, thus representing 
an actual impact on the library in terms of personnel and finances.  Also, because of the effort required to 
initiate an ILL request, on the part of the requester, they represent a clearer indication of real need on the 
part of the patron.  Therefore, ILLs are a reasonable measure of the true impact, on all parties, of leaving 
Big Deals. 
There are some limitations to the data available regarding Interlibrary loans.  Analysis of the 
Springer titles is incomplete, so only data on Wiley and Elsevier are presented here, and it should be 
noted that only one year of data is available.  Since we still have archival access to the non-subscribed 
titles for the years in which we were participating members of the Big Deal, available ILL numbers are 
restricted to the current year of content.  Lastly, because of various anomalies, such as complimentary 
access, it is not always possible to know if the University community has had access to a title, regardless 
of the information contained in our link resolver database. 
Nevertheless, the preliminary numbers are convincing.  In examining the top twenty-five percent 
of Wiley and Elsevier titles, determined by the number of downloads in the prior year, the impact of 
departure on interlibrary loans is minimal.  For Wiley, only twenty-seven percent of the lost titles had at 
least one request in the year following departure.  Further, only nine percent had more than one request.  
For Elsevier, only 38% had at least one request, and only twenty percent had more than one.   
One interesting way to measure this impact is by comparing the download numbers in the final 
year of participation versus the interlibrary loans in the year post-departure.  For Wiley, of the 125 titles 
that comprised the top twenty-five percent (as measured by downloads), which had received a total of 
7,770 downloads, there were 71 ILL requests.  Interlibrary loan demand was thus 0.9% of prior use.  For 
Elsevier, there were 46 requests for the 61 titles, compared to 15,017 downloads the prior year.  Demand 
was thus 0.3% of prior use. 
These numbers deliver an important message: download statistics are not an accurate indicator 
of demand.  They are inflated, through a number of variables. These include incidental use, such as when 
a user accesses an article without meaning to or after accessing it, determines it to be of no use.  Online 
articles are also subject to repeated use, when a user access an article once, and then finds it necessary 
to go back to read it again, perhaps revisiting it multiple times.  The method of linking can also inflate use; 
for example, Elsevier takes users from links in Google and other sources directly to the html full-text of an 
article, thus recording a download, regardless of whether the article is actually read or not.  Another 
source of inflation is created by the mere convenience of the availability of the content, as users may 
simply be trying to maximize the number of references reported, without regard to the content itself. 
Librarians are heavily reliant upon use statistics in the assessment of the value of the resources 
they acquire for their users, but these numbers show that usage statistics, even when meeting agreed- 
upon standards, are not a true indicator of user need or demand.  They should be used, obviously, but 
cautiously, and with a healthy dose of skepticism.  Other assessment techniques and metrics should be 
employed as well, to gain a more accurate picture of the needs of the community served. 
 
Measuring Impact: Reaction from the Community 
 
Community reaction to the lost access has been minimal.  Thus far, there have been less than a 
handful of complaints.  What response there has been tends to be uninformed, due to confusion between 
subscribed and non-subscribed titles, a predictable development from participation in Big Deals.  This 
confusion illustrates that departure presents an opportunity to educate faculty on Big Deals, price 
increases, and all the issues of scholarly communication that librarians are familiar with.   
When protests do arise, they can typically be dealt with by presenting numbers such as those 
provided above, as well as cost-per-download figures for lost titles.  For most titles, the latter figure 
provides a strong argument for not retaining them, because interlibrary loan presents much more 
economical means for providing access.  Another persuasive technique is to present the alternatives to 
faculty, assuming library subscriptions are assigned to specific departments.  Since our decision to leave 
the Big Deals coincided with a large journal cancellation project, it was possible to present to faculty the 
unappealing scenario of cutting other titles in order to start subscriptions to lost non-subscribed titles, a 
process necessary for meeting the target cancellation values assigned to each department.  When this 
was necessary, or deemed desirable, the academic departments were unwilling or unable to volunteer 
such swaps.  
 
Measuring Impact: The Budget 
 
Protecting the collection budget was the immediate impetus for making the decision to leave the 
Big Deals.  For Morris Library, leaving the three deals allowed us to save almost $300,000 annually.  This 
amount would have represented more than half of our FY2010 monograph funds.  Even with the large 
cancellation project for 2010, resulting in an abnormally high budget for books, this amount would have 
been about one third of the FY2011 monograph budget, still an enormous amount.  Alternatively, if the 
decision had been made to cut more from our journal subscriptions, in order to protect the monograph 
budget, many other journals would have had to be cut, almost exclusively from smaller publishers, 
including university and society presses.  
 
Measuring Impact: The Collection 
 
This leads to the final area of impact, the Library’s collection, specifically as to who will control it, 
and how.  The impact on our ability to control our collection was enormous.  The flexibility the Big Deal 
cancellation gave us was pivotal in our effort to provide a collection that the community needs.  We were 
able to cancel 230 titles from these three publishers.  This represented savings that did not have to be 
squeezed from somewhere else, either from smaller journal publishers, or from the monographs budget.   
In addition, we were able to swap titles, beyond what is typically allowed for in Big Deals to 
provide a more appropriate collection for the SIUC community.  This is important because academic 
programs change over time, as departments change, faculty come and go, and new programs are 
established.  Because we had been tightly locked into a set subscription list for years with Big Deals, we 
were restricted in our ability to address these changes. 
The savings realized from our departure and our cancellations, while no substitute for badly 
needed increases in funds, have been crucial for us.  In the end, we are in a better position to provide a 
collection more suited to the needs of the University community.  
 
Moving Forward 
 
Making the decision to leave a Big Deal is not the end of the process.  In fact, the end is just the 
beginning, as it is necessary to renegotiate arrangements with publishers for those titles still deemed 
essential for the institution.  The Big Deal is a great deal for publishers, because it provides a guaranteed 
revenue stream, with significant annual increases.  It makes forecasting simple, reliable, and the results 
are always positive for them.  Consequently, renegotiations may start off from an unavoidable strain in the 
relationship. 
The reaction from publishers, unlike from the community, are noticeable and unambiguous.  One 
publisher indicated that upon leaving, a twenty-five percent “content fee” would be applied to our 
subscriptions.  This was not widely known at the time, and still may not be, that if you end a multiyear 
deal and cancel titles, this publisher will impose this heavy surcharge.  Such a fee would have wiped out 
the value of our cancellations, and more.  On top of this, there would have been no price cap, giving the 
publisher the opportunity to raise our base to any figure they determined.    
Another publisher presented a similar problem, in that leaving the deal carried an immediate large 
increase.  This reflected a discrepancy in pricing inherent in Big Deals: as the years pass, the price paid 
for subscriptions moves further and further away from the list price.  This is because with the price caps 
typical to a Big Deal, annual price increases are lower than the publishers’ official increase (indeed, this is 
one of the attractive aspects of a Big Deal).  With this particular publisher, when we left the Big Deal, the 
list price became our new base price, a significant upfront cost for us.   
In fact, the stance taken by publishers is to make leaving so painful, as to discourage an 
institution from taking that step.  In our case, tied up with this was an absolute requirement that we be 
allowed to cancel subscriptions, at the level we felt necessary for the sake of our budget and our 
collection.  This meant that the guaranteed revenue stream, based on a subscription package determined 
years before, with guaranteed annual increases and marginal cancellation allowances, would be 
changing.  We were demanding to reduce our base, a demand we maintained throughout renegotiations. 
Negotiation can and for us, did, result in the removal of the worst terms of the publishers’ 
proposals.  Partly this reflects the fact that ultimate control and power resides with the buyer, provided the 
buyer is willing to keep the money and do without the product.  However, we found that ultimately it is 
necessary to compromise in order to minimize the impact of the changed terms proffered by the 
publishers.  This took the form of multiyear deals with price caps and little or no cancellation clauses.  
This was acceptable to us because we were able to make the cuts we needed and reduce our base, to 
find a new starting point for the new agreements.  If we hadn’t been willing to make such agreements, the 
immediate financial impact on our budget would have been significantly worse. 
 
Enforcing License Agreements 
 
A final story from our experience may be informative.  When SIUC did not renew the 
Springer/GWLA deal, the issue of archival access arose.  At the time of the original contract, GWLA had 
managed to have a clause about archival access added, specifying that LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keep 
Stuff Safe) was one acceptable means for achieving guaranteed archival access.  This showed great 
foresight, and though they could not have realized it at the time, the negotiators who had it added had 
paved the way for ensuring Springer participation in LOCKSS.  Springer had no intention of doing so at 
the expiration of the contract, at which time we discovered that Springer was not LOCKSS compliant, and 
was not making its vast reservoir of content available for harvesting by LOCKSS participants.  Springer 
informed us they had not worked with LOCKSS in the past, and would not do so in the future.  Eventually, 
after several discussions, this position was reiterated by their legal counsel at the time.  A member of 
SIUC’s legal counsel was present for that conversation, as she had been kept current on the situation, 
and had supported our efforts to see that particular clause enforced.  She drafted a document stating that 
we believed Springer to be in violation of the contract, and was quite prepared to pursue the issue.  In the 
meantime, we also informed GWLA of our experience, and we prepared a document describing the 
situation and asking the GWLA leadership to support our efforts and inform Springer of their intention to 
do so.  The leadership did so, and also took the issue to ICOLC, the International Coalition of Library 
Consortia, for their support as well.  In the end, Springer agreed to abide by the terms of the contract, and 
in 2011 began making their content available for LOCKSS harvesting.  This experience illustrates the 
kinds of unexpected issues that may arise for any institution leaving a Big Deal, and the need to be 
prepared to work for the enforcement of the terms of the expiring contract.  This effort needs to be done 
before the expiration of the contract, after which time the recourse for addressing the issue may no longer 
be available.   
 
In moving forward, then, these issues need to be considered when leaving a Big Deal: is there a 
penalty, in whatever guise, for doing so?  Is a multiyear deal the most desirable way forward?  What 
length of time is acceptable?  Will the deal provide price caps?  Strictly limit cancellations?  Finally, once 
the decision to depart has been made, it may be necessary to take prove it 
steps to ensure that the terms of the expiring license are met.    
 
Conclusions 
 
The experience of SIUC’s Morris Library in leaving Big Deals has implications for other 
institutions considering the same move.  Our experience shows that use of non-subscribed titles is 
overvalued; that interlibrary loans will not skyrocket in any proportion to reported download numbers; that 
the community will not erupt in revolt; and that conversely, the savings to the budget are large and 
ultimately essential, and that leaving Big Deals allow libraries to provide a collection more suited to the 
institution and community. 
 
The University of Oregon Experience 
Background 
 
The University of Oregon, founded in 1876, and part of the Oregon University System (OUS), is 
classified as a Carnegie very high research university, one of 108 institutions in that category.  Although 
UO has a law school, this is a relatively uncommon ranking for a university without medical, engineering 
or agricultural schools.  The University of Oregon had a 2010-11 enrollment of 23,389 FTE students, 
including 19,534 undergraduate students, and 3,885 graduate/doctoral students.  The University operates 
263 academic programs, as well as another 33 research centers and institutes that range in scope from 
Asian and Pacific Studies to Neuroscience and High Energy Physics. 
The University of Oregon Libraries comprises the central Knight Library, as well as the Jacqua 
Law Library, a science library, a mathematics library, the architecture and allied arts library as well as the 
geographically separated Portland Library and Learning Commons, which supports graduate programs in 
Oregon’s largest city, and the Oregon Institute of Marine Biology Library, which supports marine programs 
in Charleston, Oregon.  The library held 3,138,936 books and serials, 4,198,103 microforms, 783,154 
maps, 1,327,009 slides and photos in 2010.  These figures also include 291,531 electronic books and 
74,487 current serials.  Also, in 2010, patrons retrieved 2,468,633 full-text downloads (and rising) and 
made 361,809 circulations of physical items (and falling).  The total budget of the UO Libraries in 2010 
was $20,042,433 and the materials budget was $6,427,158.  It is a member of the Greater Western 
Library Alliance and the Orbis-Cascade Alliance. 
 
The University of Oregon Libraries and the Big Deal 
 
The UO Libraries have participated in a number of Big Deals over the past several years, 
including Cambridge University Press journals, the e-Duke Scholarly Collection, Sage Premier Online and 
the two collections to be discussed here: Elsevier ScienceDirect and the Wiley Online Library.  The 
Elsevier deal was initially brokered through the Orbis-Cascade Alliance, a collection of 36 large and small 
academic libraries in Oregon and Washington, and which includes UO, Oregon State University, the 
University of Washington and Washington State University. The Wiley deal was received via the Greater 
Western Library Alliance, a consortium of 32 research libraries in the west and Midwest. 
 
The Financial Crisis and the University of Oregon 
 
During 2008-09, the world was hit by one of biggest financial crises since the Great Depression, 
which had huge impacts on the nation and the world economy. The State of Oregon and the University of 
Oregon were not immune from the financial stresses that this downturn generated. As the State and the 
Oregon University System initially grappled with the impacts, initially a twenty percent budget cut was 
imposed on the state portion of the University’s overall budget.  The state presently provides only about 
nine percent of the University’s budget (causing some people to call the UO “a state university in name 
only”), but investments and endowments, major sources of income, also took big hits during this period, 
further reducing our ability to meet commitments in the existing budget. 
 The University was able to attack this problem in a number of ways, some by design and some by 
serendipity including the raising of tuition rates by 7.5% in that time period (with more to come).   In 
addition, the UO Foundation was near the close of a successful $853,000,000 fund-raising campaign, 
which included several million raised by the library itself.  There were however state (and donor) 
restrictions on how donated money could be spent, how it could be invested and when interest 
disbursements could be made, which limited how much could be used to ease the immediate financial 
shortfalls.  
 On another front, the UO benefitted greatly from the financial woes of our neighboring states’ 
even greater monetary woes, especially those of California’s, and in particular, those of the University of 
California system, where budget cuts have been deep, and tuition has risen at a far greater rate than 
ours.  Partly as a result of this, student applications to the University have skyrocketed, and UO’s total 
enrollment has increased by approximately 2,000 students in the last two years, creating many new 
tuition dollars for us. 
 
Other Financial Pressures at the University of Oregon 
 
The recession was not the only pressure on the UO Libraries.  Even had it not occurred, the 
Libraries still would have had to face the results of regularly accumulating serials inflation rates.  Since 
1992-93, the UO Libraries had had four major serials cancellation projects: 1993, 1995, 2000 and 2004-
05, totaling $1.49 million. The Libraries had effected enough cancellations and reduced format duplication 
to a minimum following the last cancellation to delay further cuts for several years. At about the same time 
that the recession hit however, inflation had finally caught up with us, and 2008-09 was coincidentally also 
targeted for what intended to be a two-year serials cancellation project. Combined with the initial budget 
rescissions required by the State of Oregon and the Oregon University System, we would now have to 
achieve serials cuts of up to $1.2 million. 
Breaking the Big Deals 
 
As we began to analyze the necessary dollar cuts versus the serials actually available to cut, it 
quickly became apparent that it would be impossible to meet our goals if we were to rely solely upon 
unattached titles from smaller, individual publishers that were not tied up in contractual “Big Deal” 
obligations. 
It was thus, clear to us that some Big Deals would have to be broken. 
 We looked at the various deals that we were involved with, and several were not good fits for 
numerous reasons, including size, available titles, scope of titles and the term of the license.  It did 
become apparent however, for somewhat different reasons, that both Elsevier and Wiley would meet our 
criteria for breaking up some of our large deals. 
Breaking the Deal: Elsevier 
 
 As an initial matter, and specific only to the University of Oregon, we had also participated in an 
unmediated pay-per-view arrangement for Elsevier journals. This was initiated to address content loss 
concerns expressed by faculty after the 2004-05 cancellation project, which had eliminated some titles 
that were at least moderately used by UO researchers, due to their high cost.  At first, this was a cost-
effective (about $25 per article) means of providing seamless (to the user) access to otherwise 
unavailable titles. As time went on, however, more people were using the service, and we had to 
replenish the Elsevier deposit account at ever-faster rates.  That factor, combined with several expensive 
instances of pay-per-view download abuses (hijacked student credentials, for example, being posted on 
an open message board, and being used to download vast amounts of geology and petroleum journal 
articles at UO’s expense) caused us to terminate this service, and bank the savings towards required 
serials cancellation targets. 
 Once this step was accomplished, UO determined that, based upon cancellation target amounts, 
it was not feasible to remain a participant in the Orbis-Cascade Alliance-brokered Elsevier deal.  In a 
sense, we had anticipated financial turmoil the previous year (due to serials inflation catching up with us 
though, not due to the yet-to-occur recession) and rather than sign the Alliance’s three-year deal with 
Elsevier, we opted to sign a one-year extension of the previous Alliance deal.  This gave us an initial 
sense of having freedom to maneuver as we started evaluating our options. 
 We considered cancelling titles outright and going it alone on a UO-only subscription plan, but 
thought it could make sense to engage our academic partners at Oregon State University (OSU; only 45 
minutes to the north of us) to develop a cooperative plan. After some initial concept meetings, we began 
to develop a statistical framework for evaluating our shared titles in terms of overall usage, cost-per-use 
and impact factors, which was spearheaded by Dean Walton, a librarian from the UO science library. 
 Before too long it was also decided to extend an offer to the other large public university in 
Oregon, Portland State University (PSU), to join our efforts. They accepted the offer, and after statistics 
were expanded and revised to include PSU, we created what could be termed an “ideal” deal based on 
keeping the titles that represented 90% or more of our combined, overall usage within a proposed new 
arrangement, discarding most everything else (exceptions were made for certain important small-
discipline niche titles that had importance to their areas not necessarily reflected by usage), as well as 
proposing target inflation rates and content fee figures.  With these steps accomplished, we then felt we 
were ready to approach Elsevier with an initial proposal. 
 Elsevier’s initial reaction to this was to request three separate meetings with the individual 
leadership groups at the three libraries, which was viewed by all of us as an attempt at a possible “divide 
and conquer” strategy, and which was quickly denied by the three libraries.  Elsevier was informed that 
the three schools would only negotiate together as a single unit.  A few weeks later, during the summer of 
2009, we held our first meeting with Elsevier representatives at the Portland State University Library, and 
we presented our initial proposal. 
 Although UO was contractually free to pursue its options at the end of 2009, OSU and PSU were 
both locked into three-year deals. In order to make any new arrangement work, our partner schools had 
to be released from their contracts.  To their credit, Elsevier, apparently deciding that it would be in its 
best interests to make this deal work, did agree to abrogate their contracts, and subsequently accepted 
the three schools as a mini-consortium that they would negotiate in good faith with. 
 In order to make such a potential deal work, we would need a combined eighteen percent of our 
combined subscription dollars with Elsevier cut. Elsevier chafed at that figure, and asked that we not 
exceed ten percent in cancellations. This caused a somewhat extended period of disagreement between 
the two sides, but eventually Elsevier offered to reduce the content fee for a potential joint deal (basically, 
a fee just for the right to access their titles).  The fee was initially proposed at twenty-five percent; Elsevier 
reduced it to 12.5%. This reduction was substantial enough for us to recalculate cancellations and reduce 
our cuts from eighteen percent to fourteen percent.   Elsevier agreed to this. 
 It was further established by Elsevier, that one of their imprints, Cell Press, which represented a 
small, but significant subset of our titles, could not be included in the proposal, due to internal restrictions. 
We did not contest this. 
 A key element of the deal would be the construction of a unique title list (UTL), which would be a 
set of non-subscribed titles that Elsevier would provide access to, at a significantly reduced price.  This 
was based on a similar arrangement that the Orbis-Cascade Alliance had brokered with Elsevier in the 
old deal. 
 Elsevier had no problems with continuing this, but offered us a couple of different options; one 
would provide a UTL, a ten percent content fee, and which would provide for full sharing of titles between 
the schools. The downside to this option was that it reverted to a ten percent cancellation ceiling.  We 
found that unacceptable. The second option provided the UTL, however with no sharing, a 12.5% content 
fee, and the fourteen percent cancellation ceiling.  This was mostly acceptable, but we held a hard line on 
title sharing, and also requested three years of zero inflation.  Elsevier relented on the sharing, but 
rejected the inflation proposal; they countered with a three year deal with inflation rates at 0%/2%/5%. 
 We accepted the basis of this deal, but given the uncertainty of the economy at the time, the 
schools decided that they would feel more comfortable with a two-year deal. All the parties agreed, and 
the agreement was eventually ratified.  
 At the time of this writing, the first two-year deal is coming to a successful conclusion and we 
recently completed negotiations for a new three-year year to go forward with, There will be no major title 
adjustments, and to the view of the UO Libraries, holds inflation to very reasonable levels. Elsevier had 
given consideration to offering us a new Big Deal in the form of their Freedom Collection, but to their 
credit, realized early on that this would not be a good fit for us. 
Post-Big Deal: Elsevier 
  
 Leaving the Orbis-Cascade deal, and creating a significantly downsized “medium deal,” ended up 
being a wise choice for us. At UO, we were spending $409,566 on Elsevier products before cuts. In 2010, 
our total spend was down to $361,689, representing an eleven percent cut at our institution. We project 
we will surpass the 2009 dollar amount again in 2014. We do also anticipate a stable serials budget 
through that year. It may last longer than that, but projections beyond that are naturally murky. The major 
budgetary impact with this downsizing then, was to buy us five years of stable serials budgets, the value 
of which cannot be underestimated,  
Other Impacts 
 
There was a coincidental, significant rise of ILL/document delivery requests experienced by the 
UO library (47%) at about the time the Elsevier cuts took hold. An analysis however, indicated that there 
was only a modest rise in those involving Elsevier titles. The larger overall increase was believed due to 
the near-simultaneous implementation of WorldCat Local at UO.  
There were very few student concerns noted after the downsizing, and only a modest amount of 
concern exhibited by faculty members. We attribute this largely to a continuous communication about the 
serials cancellations between the library’s subject specialists and their respective academic departments, 
and the involvement of teaching and research faculty in providing feedback about planned cancellations.  
The largest area of concern exhibited was from the chemistry and physics faculty, who have a 
number of high-cost and less cost-effective serial titles in their areas.  The library has primarily addressed 
these concerns by promoting a very efficient ILL/document delivery operation, which can generally 
provide any requested article within 24 hours.  However going forward, we are also examining the 
possibility of re-instituting a much smaller scale, mediated and subject-targeted pay-per-view project for 
these scientific fields.  To date, this is just conceptual and there is not yet a clear way forward. 
 
Elsevier Conclusions 
 
The University of Oregon has no regrets about eliminating these titles, or about creating the 
smaller deal.  Negative impacts have been minimal, and positive impacts, particularly on the budget, have 
been large and demonstrable.  We believe our partners in the arrangement have had similar experiences.  
They keys to success for us were cooperation with our partners, communication with our customer base, 
and a large amount of front-end preparation, particularly analyzing and evaluating prospective titles, 
which in turn, greatly minimized the negative back-end impacts, and in our view, made it a very 
successful experience. 
 
Breaking the Deal: Wiley 
 
The Elsevier cuts, while important, were not enough for UO to reach its cancellation goals 
however. Wiley, another of our biggest “Big Deals,” had a license that was due to expire at the end of 
2009, so it automatically became a prime target for us to examine for further reductions. We briefly 
considered the prospect of pursuing an additional “medium deal” with OSU as a partner for the Wiley 
titles in late summer 2009.  However, the work that was done to prepare for the Elsevier negotiations was 
considerable, and the negotiations took the better part of that summer.  At this point, relatively late in the 
year, UO collection managers had expended a lot of energy on Elsevier, and it was felt that there was not 
much left in the tank for another round, not to mention the fact the time was short, and a new school year 
was about to start. 
It was then, decided to forego this option, and to simply eliminate the GWLA Wiley deal in its 
entirety.  As such, we contacted our Wiley representative, and requested a single-institution “enhanced 
access license.”  Wiley did comply with our request, with little protest. 
Our plan with Wiley was to cancel all titles on subscription with them, and then re-order only 
those determined to be financially and academically desirable.  An additional wrinkle of complication was 
that Wiley and Blackwell hadn’t yet merged their title lists, and our serials acquisitions personnel had to 
work with two, rather than one list to complete this project.  Using a similar mechanism to the Elsevier 
evaluation, it was decided that we would cancel 96 titles that were not cost-effective for us, thus saving 
$166,103. We then re-ordered 278 titles, worth $353,513. Also, due to our exit from the deal, we lost 
access to several desirable shared titles that we had to re-subscribe to.  Our planned cancellations had to 
balance these “additions” out.  
 
Post-Big Deal: Wiley 
 
Since the termination of the Big Deal, our Wiley subscriptions have remained relatively stable. 
Blackwell titles are now fully integrated, and we still occasionally do find Wiley imprint titles that were 
missed, and which need to be folded into our single-institution license.  Also, every year, there is a small 
but constant parade or title transfers in and transfers out, that netted, for example, an additional $10,000 
in subscription costs in 2011. 
We spent $519,616 on our Wiley Big Deal in 2009.  In 2010, that amount was reduced, as has 
been mentioned, to $351,567. We expect it will be at least three additional years, into 2014 or later before 
inflation has eaten the savings that we have achieved with these cancellations. 
  
Other Impacts 
 
We are left with 297 subscribed titles from Wiley, titles that passed cost-per-use and other 
impacts analysis. We retain limited post-cancellation access to 862 titles that had been held by our GWLA 
partners.  Our current full-text access to these terminates in December 2009/January 2010.  This is a gap 
that will only continue to grow wider as time goes on.  
There was, as was noted before, a noticeable increase in ILL rates coincidental with the date that 
these cancellations took effect. Like Elsevier however, Wiley increases were modest, and the 
implementation of WorldCat Local was determined to be responsible for most of the increase.  
With respect to Wiley, we have had virtually no complaints whatsoever from faculty or students, 
and this essentially ended up being a non-event from our customer’s point-of-view. We counted this Big 
Deal elimination as a great success for us, and again, attribute a large portion of that to the upfront 
preparation that we engaged in, in order to make the smartest, most sensible cancellations possible. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The University of Oregon cancelled one full Big Deal, and shrunk a second one significantly. It 
required much thought, analysis and effort by us and our partners, but in our view, we created a pair of 
very successful results out of a very scary and uncertain financial situation. 
We are not naïve, and understand that no matter how wildly successful this effort was, that 
sometime in the near future, be in 2014, 2015 or 2016, we will have to cut again. We feel however, that 
we have established a sensible template for any future cuts, should it involve the cancellation of another 
Big Deal, or the contraction of one.  
We understand that making a major change such as this is a scary and difficult possibility for a 
library to consider.  The status quo always seems safer, but it may not be smarter.  We feel that other 
institutions that are contemplating a similar situation to what we experienced, can benefit from our 
success, and know that they can succeed as well. 
Finally, although it is easy to vilify and demonize vendors as being “evil empires” and other such 
names, they can be willing to work with you to reach a mutually beneficial result.  They may be looking 
initially at how to maximize profit, but smart vendors will know that some business is better than no 
business and will conclude that working with you is better for their bottom line, as opposed to working 
against you. 
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